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Abstract
This work provides theoretical and empirical evidence that invariance-inducing regularizers can
increase predictive accuracy for worst-case spatial transformations (spatial robustness). Evaluated on
these adversarially transformed examples, we demonstrate that adding regularization on top of standard or
adversarial training reduces the relative error by 20% for CIFAR10 without increasing the computational
cost. This outperforms handcrafted networks that were explicitly designed to be spatial-equivariant.
Furthermore, we observe for SVHN, known to have inherent variance in orientation, that robust training
also improves standard accuracy on the test set. We prove that this no-trade-off phenomenon holds for
adversarial examples from transformation groups in the infinite data limit.
1 Introduction
As deployment of machine learning systems in the real world has steadily increased over recent years, the
trustworthiness of these systems is of crucial importance. This is particularly the case for safety-critical
applications. For example, the vision system in a self-driving car should correctly classify an obstacle or
human irrespective of their orientation. Besides being relevant from a security perspective, a measure for
spatial invariance also helps to gauge interpretability and reliability of a model. If an image of a child rotated
by 10◦ is classified as a trash can, can we really trust the system in the wild?
As neural networks have been shown to be expressive both theoretically [18, 4, 15] and empirically [48], in this
work we study to what extent standard neural networks predictors can be made invariant to small rotations
and translations. In contrast to enforcing conventional invariance on entire group orbits, we weaken the goal
to invariance on smaller so-called transformation sets. This requirement reflects the aim to be invariant to
transformations that do not affect the labeling by a human. During test time we assess transformation set
invariance by computing the prediction accuracy on the worst-case (adversarial) transformation in the (small)
transformation set of each image in the test data. The higher this worst-case prediction accuracy of a model
is, the more spatially robust we say it is. Importantly, we use the same terminology as in the very active field
of adversarially robust learning [40, 29, 23, 33, 6, 26, 37, 39, 35, 44, 28], but we consider adversarial examples
with respect to spatial instead of `p-transformations of an image.
Recently, it was observed in [11, 13, 34, 20, 14, 2] that worst-case prediction performance drops dramatically for
neural network classifiers obtained using standard training, even for rather small transformation sets. In this
context, we examine the effectiveness of regularization that explicitly encourages the predictor to be constant
for transformed versions of the same image, which we refer to as being invariant on the transformation sets.
Broadly speaking, there are two approaches to encourage invariance of neural network predictors. On the one
hand, the relative simplicity of the mathematical model for rotations and translations has led to carefully
hand-engineered architectures that incorporate spatial invariance directly [19, 24, 8, 27, 45, 43, 12, 41]. On
the other hand, augmentation-based methods [3, 47] constitute an alternative approach to encourage desired
invariances on transformation sets. Specifically, the idea is to augment the training data by a random or
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smartly chosen transformation of every image for which the predictor output is enforced to be close to the
output of the original image. This invariance-inducing regularization term is then added to the cross entropy
loss for back-propagation.
While augmentation-based methods can be used out of the box whenever it is possible to generate samples
in the transformation set of interest, it is unclear how they compare to architectures that are tuned for the
particular type of transformation using prior knowledge. Studying robustness against spatial transformations
in particular allows us to compare the robust performance of these two approaches, as spatial-equivariant
networks have been somewhat successful in enforcing invariance. In contrast, this cannot be claimed for
higher-dimensional `p-type perturbations. In the empirical sections of this paper, we hence want to explore
the following questions:
1. To what extent can augmentation and regularization based methods improve spatial robustness of
common deep neural networks?
2. How does augmentation-based invariance-inducing regularization perform in case of small spatial
transformations compared to representative specialized architectures designed to achieve invariance
against entire transformation groups?
As a justification for employing this form of invariance-inducing regularization, we prove in our theoretical
section 2 that when perturbations come from transformation groups, predictors that optimize the robust loss
are in fact invariant on the set of transformed images. Although recent works show a fundamental trade-off
between robust and standard accuracy in constructed `p perturbation settings [42, 49, 36], we additionally
show that this is fundamentally different for spatial transformations due to their group structure.
For the empirical study, we implemented various augmentation based training methods as described in
Sec. 3. In Sec. 4, we compare spatial robustness for augmentation-based methods and specialized neural
network architectures on CIFAR-10 and SVHN. Although group-invariance should automatically imply robust
predictions against all transformations in the group, group-equivariant networks have not been extensively
evaluated using adversarially chosen, but rather random transformations. In experiments with CIFAR-10 and
SVHN, we find that regularized methods can achieve ∼ 20% relative adversarial error reduction compared to
previously proposed augmentation-based methods (including adversarial training) without requiring additional
computational resources. Furthermore, they even outperform representative handcrated networks that were
explicitly designed for invariance.
2 Theoretical results for invariance-inducing regularization
In this section, we first introduce our notion of transformation sets and formalize robustness against a small
range of translations and rotations. We then prove that, on a population level, constraining or regularizing
for transformation set invariance yields models that minimize the robust loss. Moreover, when the label
distribution is constant on each transformation set, we show that the set of robust minimizers not only
minimizes the natural loss but, under mild conditions on the distribution over the transformations, is even
equivalent to the set of natural minimizers.
Although the framework can be applied to general problems and transformation groups, we consider image
classification for concreteness. In the following, X ∈ X ⊂ Rd are the observed images, Y ∈ Rp is the
one-hot vector for multiclass labels and both are random variables from a joint distribution P. The function
f : Rd → Rp in function space F (e.g. deep neural network in experiments) maps the input image to a logit
vector that is then used for prediction via a softmax layer.
2.1 Transformation sets
Invariance with respect to spatial transformations is often thought of in terms of group equivariance of the
representation and prediction. Instead of invariance with respect to all spatial transformations in a group, we
impose a weaker requirement, that is invariance against transformation sets, defined as follows. We denote
by Gz a compact subset of images in the support of P that can be obtained by transformation of an image
z ∈ X . Gz is called a transformation set. For example in the case of rotations, the transformation set Gz
corresponds to the set of observed images in a dataset that are different versions of the same image z, that
can be obtained by small rotations of one another.
By the technical assumption on the space of real images that the sampling operator is bijective, the mapping
z → Gz is bijective. We can hence define G, a set of transformation sets, by G = ∪z∈XGz for a given
transformation group. Importantly, the bijectivity assumption also leads to Gz being disjoint for different
images z ∈ X . The above definition is distribution dependent and G partitions the support X˜ of the
distribution. More details on the aforementioned concepts and definitions can be found in Sec. A.1 in the
Appendix.
We say that a function f is (transformation-)invariant if f(x) = f(x′) for all x, x′ ∈ U for all U ∈ G and
denote the class of all such functions by V. Using this notation, fitting a model with high accuracy under
worst-case “small” transformations of the input can be mathematically captured by the robust optimization
formulation [5] of minimizing the robust loss
Lrob(f) := E X,Y sup
x′∈GX
`(f(x′), Y ) (1)
in some function space F . We call the solution of this problem the (spatially) robust minimizer. While
adversarial training aims to optimize the empirical version of Eq. (1), the converged predictor might be
far from the global population minimum, in particular in the case of nonconvex optimization landscapes
encountered when training neural networks. Furthermore, we show in the following section that for robustness
over transformation sets, constraining the model class to invariant functions leads to the same optimizer
of the robust loss. These facts motivate invariance-inducing regularization which we then show to exhibit
improved robust test accuracy in practice.
2.2 Regularization to encourage invariance
For any regularizer R, we define the corresponding constrained set of functions V(R) as
V(R) := {f : R(f, x, y) = 0 ∀(x, y) ∈ supp(P)},
where supp(P) denotes the support of P. When R(f, x, y) = supx′∈Gx h(f(x), f ′(x)) and h is a semimetric1
on Rp, we have V(R) = V. We now consider constrained optimization problems of the form
min
f∈F
E `(f(X), Y ) s.t. f ∈ V(R), (O1)
min
f∈F
E sup
x′∈GX
`(f(x′), Y ) s.t. f ∈ V(R). (O2)
The following theorem shows that (O1), (O2) are equivalent to (1) if the set of all invariant functions V is a
subset of the function space F .
Theorem 1. If V ⊆ F , all minimizers of the adversarial loss (1) are in V. If furthermore V(R) ⊆ V, any
solution of the optimization problems (O1), (O2) minimizes the adversarial loss.
1The weaker notion of a semimetric satisfies almost all conditions for a metric without having to satisfy the triangle inequality.
The proof of Theorem 1 can be found in the Appendix in Sec. A.2. Since exact projection onto the constrained
set is in general not achievable for neural networks, an alternative method to induce invariance is to relax the
constraints by only requiring f ∈ {f : R(f, x, y) ≤  ∀(x, y) ∈ supp(P)}. Using Lagrangian duality, (O1)
and (O2) can then be rewritten in penalized form for some scalar λ > 0 as
min
f∈F
Lnat(f ;R, λ) := min
f∈F
E `(f(X), Y ) + λR(f,X, Y ), (2)
min
f∈F
Lrob(f ;R, λ) := min
f∈F
E sup
x′∈GX
`(f(x′), Y ) + λR(f,X, Y ). (3)
In Sec. 2.4 we discuss how ordinary adversarial training, and modified variants that have been proposed
thereafter, can be viewed as special cases of Eqs. (2) and (3). On the other hand, the constrained regularization
formulation corresponds to restricting the function space and is hence comparable with hand-crafted network
architecture design as described in Sec. 3.1.
2.3 Trade-off between natural and robust accuracy
Even though high robust accuracy (1) might be the main goal in some applications, one might wonder
whether the robust minimizer exhibits lower accuracy on untransformed images (natural accuracy) defined as
Lnat(f) := E X,Y `(f(X), Y ) [42, 49]. In this section we address this question and identify the conditions for
transformation set perturbations under which minimizing the robust loss does not lead to decreased natural
accuracy. Notably, it even increases under mild assumptions.
One reason why adversarial examples have attracted a lot of interest is because the prediction of a given classifier
can change in a perturbation set in which all images appear the same to the human eye. Mathematically, in
the case of transformation sets, the latter can be modeled by a property of the true distribution. Namely, it
translates into the conditional distribution Y given x, denoted by PGx , being constant for all x belonging to the
same subset U ∈ G. In other words, Y is conditionally independent of X given GX , i.e. Y ⊥⊥ X|GX . Under
this assumption the next theorem shows that there is no trade-off in natural accuracy for the transformation
robust minimizer.
Theorem 2 (Trade-off natural vs. robust accuracy). Under the assumption of Theorem 1 and if Y ⊥⊥ X|GX
holds, the adversarial minimizer also minimizes the natural loss. If moreover, PGz has support Gz for every
z ∈ X˜ and the loss ` is injective, then every minimizer of the natural loss also has to be invariant.
As a consequence, minimizing the constrained optimization problem (O1) could potentially help in finding
the optimal solution to minimize standard test error. Practically, the assumption on the distribution of the
transformation sets Gz corresponds to assuming non-zero inherent transformation variance in the natural
distribution of the dataset. In practice, we indeed observe a boost in natural accuracy for robust invariance-
inducing methods in Sec. 4 on SVHN, a commonly used benchmark dataset for spatial-equivariant networks
for this reason.
One might wonder how this result relates to several recent publications such as [42, 49] that presented toy
examples for which the `∞ robust solution must have higher natural loss than the Bayes optimal solution
even in the infinite data limit. On a fundamental level, `∞ perturbation sets are of different nature compared
to transformation sets on generic distributions of X . In the distribution considered in [42, 49], there is no
unique mapping from x ∈ X to a perturbation set and thus the conditional independence property does not
hold in general.
2.4 Different regularizers and practical implementation
In order to improve robustness against spatial transformations we consider different choices of R(f, x, y) in
the regularized objectives (2) and (3) that we then compare empirically in Sec. 4. This allows us to view a
number of variants of adversarial training in a unified framework. Broadly speaking, each approach listed
below consists of first searching an adversarial example according to some mechanism which is then included
in a regularizing function, often some weak notion of distance between the prediction at X and the new
example. The following choices of regularizers involve the maximization of a regularizing function over the
transformation set
RAT(f,X, Y ) = sup
x′∈GX
`(f(x′), Y )− `(f(X), Y ) (equivalent to [40, 26] for Lnat)
R`2(f,X, Y ) = sup
x′∈GX
‖f(X)− f(x′)‖22
RKL(f,X, Y ) = sup
x′∈GX
DKL(f(x′), f(X)) (equivalent to [49] for Lnat)2
where DKL is the KL divergence on the softmax of the (logit) vectors f ∈ Rp. In all cases we refer to the
maximizer as an adversarial example that is found using defense mechanisms as discussed in Section 3.3.
Note that for R`2 and RKL the assumption V(R) ⊆ V in Theorem 1 is satisfied.
Instead of performing a maximization of the regularizing function to find the adversarial example x′, we
can also choose x′ in alternative ways The following variants are explored in the paper, two of which are
reminiscent of previous work
RALP(f,X, Y ) = ‖f(x′)− f(X)‖22 with x′ = arg max
u∈GX
`(f(u), Y ) (equivalent to [21])
RKL-C(f,X, Y ) = DKL(f(x′), f(X)) with x′ = arg max
u∈GX
`(f(u), Y )
Rh−DA(f,X) = E x′∈GXh(f,X,X ′) (similar to [17])
The last regularizer suggests using an additive penalty on top of data augmentation, with either one or
even multiple random draws, where the penalty can be any of the above semimetrics h between f(X) and
f(x′), such as the `2 or DKL distance. Albeit suboptimal, the experimental results in Section 4 suggest that
simply adding the additive regularization penalty on top of randomly drawn data matches general adversarial
training in terms of robust prediction at a fraction of the computational cost. In addition, Theorem 2 suggests
that even when the goal is to improve standard accuracy and one expects inherent variance of nuisance
factors in the data distribution it is likely helpful to use regularized data augmentation with Rh−DA instead
of vanilla data augmentation. Empirically we observe this on the SVHN dataset in Section 4.
Adversarial example for spatial transformation sets Since GX is not a closed group and we do not
even know whether the observation X lies at the boundary of GX or in the interior, we cannot solve the
maximization constrained to GX in practice. However, for an appropriate choice of set S, we can instead
minimize an upper bound of (1) which reads
min
f∈F
E sup
∆∈S
`(f(T (X,∆)), Y ) ≥ min
f∈F
E sup
x′∈GX
`(f(x′), Y ) (4)
where S is the set of transformations that we search over and T (X,∆) denotes the transformed image with
transformation ∆ (see Sec. A.1 in the Appendix for an explicit construction of the transformation search
set S). The left hand side in (4) is hence what we aim to solve in practice where the expectation is over
the empirical joint distribution of X,Y . The relaxation of GX to a range of transformations of X that is
{T (X,∆) : ∆ ∈ S} is also used for the maximization within the regularizers.
In Figure 1 one pair of example images is shown: the original image (panel (a)) is depicted along with a
transformed version T (·,∆) with ∆ ∈ S (panel (b)) and the respective predictions by a standard neural
network classifier.
3 Experimental setup
In our experiments, we compare invariance-inducing regularization incorporated via various augmentation-
based methods (as described in Section 2.4) used on standard networks and representative spatial equivariant
networks trained using standard optimization procedures.
3.1 Spatial equivariant networks
We compare the robust prediction accuracies from networks trained with the regularizers with three spe-
cialized architectures, designed to be equivariant against spatial transformations and translations: (a)
G-ResNet44 (GRN) [8] using p4m convolutional layers (90 degree rotations, translations and mirror reflec-
tions) on CIFAR-10; (b) Equivariant Transformer Networks (ETN) [41], a generalization of Polar Transformer
Networks (PTN) [12], on SVHN; and (c) Spatial Transformer Networks (STN) [19] on SVHN. A more
comprehensive discussion of the literature on equivariant networks can be found in Sec. 5. We choose the
architectures listed above based on availability of reproducible code and previously reported state-of-the art
standard accuracies on SVHN and CIFAR10. We train GRN, STNand ETN using standard augmentation
as described in Sec. 3.4 (std) and random rotations in addition (std?). Out of curiosity we also trained a
“two-stage” STN where we train the localization network separately in a supervised fashion. Specifically, we
use a randomly transformed version of the training data, treating the transformation parameters as prediction
targets. Details about the implementation and results can be found in Sec. B in the Appendix.
3.2 Transformations
The transformations that we consider in Sec. 4 are small rotations (of up to 30◦) and translations in two
dimensions of up to 3 px corresponding to approx. 10% of the image size. For augmentation based methods we
need to generate such small transformations for a given test image. Although the definition of a transformation
T (X,∆) in the theoretical section using the corresponding continuous image functions is clean, we do not
have acccess to the continuous function in practice since the mapping is in general not bijective. Instead, we
use bilinear interpolation, as implemented in TensorFlow and in a differentiable version of a transformer [19]
for first order attack and defense methods.
Truth: ship Pred.: airplane
(a) (b)
Figure 1: Example images and classifications by the Standard
model. (a) An image that is correctly classified for most of the
rotations in the considered grid. (b) One rotation for which the
image shown in (b) is misclassified as “airplane”.
On top of interpolation, rotation also creates edge artifacts at the boundaries, as the image is only sampled
in a bounded set. The empty space that results from translating and rotating an image is filled with black
pixels (constant padding) if not noted otherwise. Fig. 1 (b) shows an example. [11] additionally analyze a
“black canvas“ setting where the images are padded with zeros prior to applying the transformation, ensuring
that no information is lost due to cropping. Their experiments show that the reduced accuracy of the models
cannot be attributed to this effect. Since both versions yield similar results, we report results on the first
version of pad and crop choices, having input images of the same size as the original.
3.3 Attacks and defenses
The attacks and defenses we choose essentially follow the setup in [11]. The defense refers to the procedure
at training time which aims to make the resulting model robust to adversarial examples. It generally differs
from the (extensive) attack mechanism performed at evaluation time to assess the model’s robustness due to
computational constraints.
Considered attacks First order methods such as projected gradient descent that have proven to be most
effective for `∞ transformations are not optimal for finding adversarial examples with respect to rotations and
translations. In particular, our experiments confirm the observations reported in [11] that the most adversarial
examples can be found through a grid search. For the grid search attack, the compact perturbation set S is
discretized to find the transformation resulting in a misclassification with the largest loss `. In contrast to
the case of `∞-adversarial examples, this method is computationally feasible for the 3-dimensional spatial
parameters. We consider a default grid of 5 values per translation direction and 31 values for rotation,
yielding 775 transformed examples that are evaluated for each Xi. We refer to the accuracy attained under
this attack as grid accuracy. How did we ensure the number of transformations in the grid are sufficient?
Considering with a finer grid of 7500 transformations for a subset of the experiments, summarized in Table 11,
showed only minor reductions in accuracy compared to the coarser grid. Therefore, we chose the latter for
computational reasons.
Considered defenses For the adversarial example which maximizes either the loss or regularization function,
we use the following defense mechanisms:
• worst-of-k: At every iteration t, we sample k different perturbations for each image in the batch. The
one resulting in the highest function value is used as the maximizer. Most of our experiments are
conducted with k = 10 consistent with [11] as a higher k only improved performance minimally (see
Table 6).
• Spatial PGD: In analogy to common practice for `p adversarial training as in e.g. [40, 26], the S-PGD
mechanism uses projected gradient descent with respect to the translation and rotation parameters
with projection on the constrained set S of transformations. We consider 5 steps of PGD, starting
from a random initialization, with step sizes of [0.03, 0.03, 0.3] (following [11]) for horizontal-, vertical
translation and rotation respectively. A discussion on the discrepancy between S-PGD as a defense and
attack mechanism can be found in Section C.2.
• Random: Data augmentation with a distinct random perturbation per image and iteration. This can
be seen as the most naive “adversarial” example as it corresponds to worst-of-k with k = 1.
3.4 Training details
The experiments are conducted with deep neural networks as the function space F and ` is the cross-entropy
loss. In the main paper we consider the datasets SVHN [32] and CIFAR-10 [22]. For the non-specialized
architectures, we train a ResNet-32 [16], implemented in TensorFlow [1]. For the Transformer networks STN
and ETN we use a 3-layer CNN as localization according to the default settings in the provided code of both
networks for SVHN and rot-MNIST. For a subset of the experiments we also report results for CIFAR-100
[22] in the Appendix.
We train the baseline models with standard data augmentation: random left-right flips and random translations
of ±4px followed by normalization. Below we refer to the models trained in this fashion as “std”. For the
models trained with one of the defenses described in Sec. 3.3, we only apply random left-right flipping since
translations are part of the adversarial search. The special case of data augmentation (with translations and
rotations, i.e. the defense “random”) without regularization is refered to as std?.
For optimization of the empirical training loss, we run standard minibatch SGD with a momentum term with
parameter 0.9 and weight decay parameter 0.0002. We use an initial learning rate of 0.1 which is divided
by 10 after half and three-quarters of the training steps. Independent of the defense method, we fix the
number of iterations to 80000 for SVHN and CIFAR-10, and to 120000 for CIFAR-100. For comparability
across all methods, the number of unique original images in each iteration is 64 in all cases. For the baselines
std, std? and Adversarial training, we additionally trained with a conventional batch size of 128 and report
the higher accuracy of both versions. For the regularized methods, the value of λ is chosen based on the
test grid accuracy. All models are trained using a single GPU on a node equipped with an NVIDIA GeForce
GTX 1080 Ti and two 10-core Xeon E5-2630v4 processors.
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Figure 2: Mean runtime for different methods on CIFAR-10. The connected points correspond to Wo-k defenses
with k ∈ {1, 10, 20}.
4 Empirical Results
We now compare the natural test accuracy (standard accuracy on the test set, abbreviated as nat) and test
grid accuracy (as defined in Sec. 3.3, abbreviated as rob) achieved by standard and regularized (adversarial)
training techniques as well as specialized spatial equivariant architectures described in Sec. 3.1. For clarity of
presentation, the naming convention we use in the rest of the paper consists of the following components: (a)
Reg : refers to what regularizer was used (AT, ALP, `2, KL, or KL-C as defined in Section 2.4); (b) batch:
indicates whether the gradient of the loss is taken with respect to the adversarial examples (rob), natural
examples (nat) or both (mix), and (c) def: the mechanism used to find the adversarial example, including
random (rnd), worst-of-k (Wo-k) and spatial PGD (S-PGD) as described in Sec. 3.3. Thus, Reg (batch, def)
corresponds to using Reg as the regularization function, the examples defined by batch in the gradient of
the loss and the defense mechanism def to find the augmented or adversarial examples.
In Table 1, we report results for a subset of the Reg (batch, def) combinations to facilitate comparisons.
Tables with many more combinations can be found Tables 4–9 in the Appendix. We report averages (standard
errors are contained in Tables 4–9) computed over five training runs with identical hyperparameter settings.
We compare all methods by computing absolute and relative error reductions (defined as absolute error dropprior error ).
It is insightful to present both numbers since the absolute values vary drastically between datasets.
Effectiveness of augmentation-based invariance-inducing regularization In Table 1 (top), the three
leftmost columns represent unregularized methods which all perform worse in grid accuracy than regularized
methods and the two right-most columns represent adversarial examples with respect to the classification cross
entropy loss found via S-PGD. When considering the three regularizers (KL, `2, ALP) with the same batch
Table 1: Mean accuracies of models trained with various forms of regularized adversarial training as well
as standard augmentation techniques (top) and spatial equivariant networks (bottom). ? denotes standard
augmentation plus random rotations. The highest accuracies per row are bolded.
std std? AT (rob,Wo-10)
KL (rob,
Wo-10)
`2 (rob,
Wo-10)
ALP (rob,
Wo-10)
KL-C (mix,
S-PGD)
ALP (rob,
S-PGD)
SVHN (nat) 95.48 93.97 96.03 96.13 96.53 96.30 96.14 96.11
(rob) 18.85 82.60 90.35 92.71 92.55 92.04 92.42 92.32
CIFAR (nat) 92.11 89.93 91.76 90.41 90.53 90.11 89.98 89.85
(rob) 9.52 58.29 71.17 77.47 77.06 75.9 78.93 77.80
GRN GRN? ETN ETN? STN STN?
SVHN (nat) 96.07 95.05 95.53 95.57 95.61 95.55
(rob) 25.12 84.9 13.15 84.21 36.68 79.28
CIFAR (nat) 93.39 93.08 – – – –
(rob) 16.85 71.64 – – – –
Table 2: Mean accuracies of models trained with various forms of regularized adversarial training. Left: All
adversarial examples were found via Wo-10; right: unregularized (std?) and regularized data augmentation
where the optimum is bolded for each row.
KL (nat,
Wo-10)
`2 (nat,
Wo-10)
ALP (nat,
Wo-10) std
? `2 (nat,
rnd)
KL (nat,
rnd)
`2 (rob,
rnd)
KL (rob,
rnd)
SVHN (nat) 96.00 96.05 96.39 93.97 96.34 96.16 96.09 96.23
(rob) 92.27 92.16 91.98 82.60 90.51 90.69 90.48 90.92
CIFAR (nat) 90.83 88.32 88.78 89.93 87.80 89.33 88.75 89.47
(rob) 77.34 75.64 75.43 58.29 71.60 73.50 71.49 73.22
and def (here chosen to be “rob” and Wo-10) regularized adversarial training improves the grid accuracy
from 71.17% to 77.47% on CIFAR-10 and 90.35% to 92.71% on SVHN, corresponding to a relative error
reduction of 22% and 24% respectively. The same can be observed when comparing data augmentation std?
and its regularized variants `2(·, rnd),KL(·, rnd) in Table 2. Together with Tables 5 and 6, S-PGD seems to
be the more efficient defense mechanism compared to worst-of-k even when k is raised to 20, with comparable
computation time.
Computational considerations In Figure 2, we plot the grid accuracy vs. the runtime (in hours) for a
subset of regularizers and defense mechanisms on CIFAR-10 for clarity of presentation. How much overhead
is needed to obtain the reported gains? Comparing AT(rob, Wo-k) (green line) and ALP(rob, Wo-k) (red
line) shows that significant improvements in grid accuracy can be achieved by regularization with only a
small computational overhead. What if we make the defense stronger? While the leap in robust accuracy
from Wo-1 (also referred to as rnd) to Wo-10 is quite large, increasing k to 20 only gives diminishing returns
while requiring ∼ 3× more training time. This observation is summarized exemplarily for both KL and ALP
regularizer on CIFAR-10 in Table 7. Furthermore, for any fixed training time, regularized methods exhibit
higher robust accuracies where the gap varies with the particular choice of regularizer and defense mechanism.
Comparison with spatial equivariant networks Although the rotation-augmented G-ResNet44 obtains
higher grid (SVHN: 84.9%, CIFAR-10: 71.64%) and natural accuracies (SVHN: 95%, CIFAR-10: 93.08%)
than the rotation-augmented Resnet-32 on both SVHN (grid: 82.60%, nat: 93.97%) and CIFAR10 (grid:
58.29%, nat: 89.93%), regularizing standard data augmentation (i.e. regularizers with “rnd”, see Table 2
(right)) using both the `2 distance and the KL divergence matches the G-ResNet44 on CIFAR10 (`2: 71.60%,
KL: 73.50%) and surpasses it on SVHN on grid (`2: 90.51%, KL: 90.69%) and natural accuracies by a
relative grid error reduction of ∼ 37%. The same phenomenon is observed for the augmented ETNand
STNon SVHN.3 In conclusion, regularized augmentation based methods match or outperform representative
end-to-end networks handcrafted to be equivariant to spatial transformations.
Trade-off natural vs. adversarial accuracy SVHN is one of the main datasets (without artificial
augmentation like in rot-MNIST [25]) where spatial equivariant networks have reported improvements on
natural accuracy. This is due to the inherent orientation variance in the data. In our mathematical framework,
this corresponds to the assumption in Theorem 2 of the distribution on the transformation sets having support
Gz. Furthermore, as all numbers in SVHN have the same label irrespective of small rotations of at most
30 degrees, the first assumption in Theorem 2 is also fulfilled. Table 1 and 2 confirm the statement in the
Theorem that improving robust accuracy may not hurt natural accuracy or even improve it: For SVHN,
adding regularization to samples obtained both via Wo-10 adversarial search or random transformation (rnd)
consistently not only helps robust but also standard accuracy.
Comparing the effects of different regularization parameters on test grid accuracy We study
Tables 1 and 2 and attempt to disentangle the effects by varying only one parameter. For example we can
observe that, computational cost aside, fixing any regularizer defense to Wo-10, the robust regularized loss
Reg (rob, Wo-10) (i.e., Lrob(f ;R)) does better (or not statistically significantly worse) than Reg (nat, Wo-10)
(i.e., Lnat(f ;R)). Furthermore, the KL regularizer generally performs better than `2 for a large number of
settings. A possible explanation for the latter could be that DKL upper bounds the squared `2 loss on the
probability simplex and is hence more restrictive.
Choice of λ The different regularization methods peak at different λ in terms of grid accuracy. However,
they outperform unregularized methods in a large range of λ values, suggesting that well-performing values
of λ are not difficult to find in practice. These can be seen in Figures 4 and 5 in the Appendix.
There are many more interesting experiments we have conducted for subsets of the defenses and datasets
illustrating different phenomena that we observe. For example we have analyzed a finer grid for the grid
search attack and evaluated S-PGD as an attack mechanism. A detailed discussion of these experiments can
be found in Sec. C.2.
5 Related work
Group equivariant networks There are in general two types of approaches to incorporate spatial invariance
into the network. In one of the earlier works in the neural net era, Spatial Transformer Networks were
introduced [19] which includes a transformer module that predicts transformation parameters followed by a
transformer. Later on, one line of work proposed multiple filters that are discrete group transformations of each
other [24, 27, 8, 51, 45]. For continuous transformations, steerability [43, 9] and coordinate transformation
[12, 41] based approaches have been suggested. Although these approaches have resulted in improved standard
accuracy performances, it has not been rigorously studied whether or by how much they improve upon regular
networks with respect to robust test accuracy.
Regularized training Using penalty regularization to encourage robustness and invariance when training
neural networks has been studied in different contexts: for distributional robustness [17], domain generalization
[30], `p adversarial training [31, 21, 49], robustness against simple transformations [7] and semi-supervised
learning [50, 46]. These approaches are based on augmenting the training data either statically [17, 30, 7, 46],
ie. before fitting the model, or adaptively in the sense of adversarial training, with different augmented
examples per training image generated in every iteration [21, 31, 49].
3We had difficulties to train both ETNand STN to higher than 86% natural accuracy for CIFAR10 even after an extensive
learning rate and schedule search so we do not report the numbers here.
Robustness against simple transformations Approaches targeting adversarial accuracy for simple
transformations have used attacks and defenses in the spirit of PGD (either on transformation space [11] or
on input space projecting to transformation manifold [20]) and simple random or grid search [11, 34]. Recent
work [10] has also evaluated some rotation-equivariant networks with different training and attack settings
which reduces direct comparability with e.g. adversarial based defenses [11].
6 Conclusion
In this work, we have explored how regularized augmentation-based methods compare against specialized
spatial equivariant networks in terms of robustness against small translations and rotations. Strikingly,
even though augmentation can be applied to encourage any desired invariance, the regularized methods
adapt well and perform similarly or better than specialized networks. Furthermore, we have introduced
a theoretical framework incorporating many forms of regularization techniques that have been proposed
in the literature. Both theoretically and empirically, we showed that for transformation invariances and
under certain practical assumptions on the distribution, there is no trade-off between natural and adversarial
accuracy which stands in contrast to the debate around `p-perturbation sets. In summary, it is advantageous
to replace unregularized with regularized training for both augmentation and adversarial defense methods.
With regard to the regularization parameter choice we have seen that improvements can be obtained for a
large range of λ values, indicating that this additional hyperparameter is not difficult to tune in practice. In
future work, we aim to explore whether specialized architectures can be combined with regularized adversarial
training to improve upon the best results reported in this work.
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A Appendix
A.1 Rigorous definition of transformation sets and choice of S
In the following we introduce the concepts that are needed to rigorously define transformation sets that
are subsets of the finite-dimensional (sampled) image space X ⊂ Rd. In particular, because rotations of
continuous angles are not well-defined for sampled images we need to introduce the space of image functions
I with elements I : R2 → [0, 255]3, i.e. I maps Euclidean coordinates in R2 to the RGB intensities of an
image. The observed finite-dimensional vector is then a sampled version of an image function I. Here we
assume that the sampling operator is bijective, with rigorous definitions later in the section.
Next we define subsets in the continuous function space and then transfer the concept back to the finite-
dimensional X . Let us define the symmetric group G of all rotations and horizontal and vertical translations
acting on I. We denote the elements in the group by g∆, uniquely parameterized by ∆ ∈ R3 and can be
represented by a coordinate transform matrix G∆, see e.g. [8]. Two of the three dimensions represent the
values for the translations and the third represents the rotation.
The transformed image (function) g∆(I) ∈ I can be expressed by g∆(I)(v) = I(G−1∆ v) for each v ∈ R2 where
G∆ is the coordinate transform matrix associated with ∆ ∈ R3 as in [8]. For each I ∈ I, the group orbit is
G(I) := {g∆(I) : g∆ ∈ G}. By definition, the group orbits partition the space I and every I ∈ I belongs to a
unique orbit.
Subsets of orbits In our setting, requiring invariance in the entire orbit (i.e. with respect to all translations
and rotations) is too restrictive. First of all, large transformations rarely occur in nature because of physical
laws and common human perspectives (an upside down tower for example). Secondly, in image classification,
robustness is usually only required against adversarial attacks which would not fool humans, i.e. lead them to
mislabel the image. If the transformation set is too large, this requirement is no longer fulfilled. For this
purpose we consider a closed subset GI of each group orbit. It follows from the group orbit definition that for
every I it either belongs to one unique or no such set.
As described in the paragraph of Equation (4), when observing a (sampled) image I ′ in the training set, we
do not know where in its corresponding subset GI′ it lies. At the same time, for our augmentation-based
methods, we do not want the set S of transformations that we search over (transformation search set for
short), to be image dependent. Instead, in this construction we aim to find S to be the smallest set of
transformations such that (4) is satisfied. For this purpose, it suffices that the effective search set of images
SI
′
for any image I ′ ∈ GI covers the corresponding subset GI for all I, i.e.
SI
′
:= {g∆(I ′) : ∆ ∈ S} ⊃ GI .
Here we give an explicit construction of S using the maximal transformation for each subset GI that is needed
to transform an image of the subset to another. In particular, we define the maximal transformation vector
∆? ∈ R3 by the element-wise maximum over all such maximum transformations
(∆?)j := max
I∈I
max
U,U ′∈GI
|(∆)j | s.t. U ′ = g∆(U)
for j = 1, . . . , 3. Although the subsets themselves for each image are not known, using prior knowledge in each
application one can usually estimate the largest possible range of transformations ∆? against which robustness
is desired or required. For example for images, one could use experiments with humans to determine for
which range of angles their reaction time to correctly label each image stays approximately constant. The
maximal vector ∆? can now be used to determine the minimal set of transformations S = (−∆?,∆?). A
simplified illustration for when I consists of just one orbit (corresponding for example to one image function
and all its rotated variants) can be found in Figure 3.
𝑆𝐼1
𝔾𝐼
𝔾 𝐼 = ℐ
△∗
−△∗
𝐼1 𝑆
𝐼2
𝔾𝐼
𝔾(𝐼) = ℐ
△∗
−△∗
𝐼2
𝑆𝐼1
𝔾𝐼
𝔾 𝐼 = ℐ
△∗
−△∗
𝐼1 𝑆
𝐼2
𝔾𝐼
𝔾(𝐼) = ℐ
△∗
−△∗
𝐼2
𝑆𝐼3
𝔾𝐼
𝔾(𝐼) = ℐ
△∗−△
∗
𝐼3
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 3: Illustration of an example where one group orbit G(I) =: I is the entire space of images and I is
an arbitrary image in the orbit G(I). We depict one subset of the orbit GI and the effective search sets SI′
for different instantiations I ′ ∈ GI defined by the transformation search set S: (a) I1 on the left boundary of
GI , (b) I2 in the interior of GI and (c) I3 on the right boundary of GI . The effective search sets are centered
around each instantation Ij . The necessity of symmetry of the minimal set of transformations S arises from
the requirement to cover GI from both boundary points and the maximum transformation vector ∆? that
defines S = (−∆?,∆?) is determined by the maximum transformation in GI (in blue).
Sampling issues In reality, the observed image is not a function on R2 but a vector z ∈ Rw×h that is the
result of sampling an image function I ∈ I. We use Φ to denote the sampling operator and hence z = Φ(I).
Then the space of observed finite dimensional images X is the range space of Φ. In order to counter the
problem that the sampling operator is in general not injective, we add another constraint to I by requiring
that Φ is bijective so that the quantity Iz = Φ−1(z) is well-defined. That is, for a finite-dimensional image
z ∈ X , there exists exactly one possible continuous image Iz ∈ I. As a consequence, if z and a transformed
version z′ exist in X , then Iz = Iz′ . This is a rather technical assumption that is typically fulfilled in practice.
In the main text, we also refer to T (z,∆) = Φ(g∆(Iz)) ∈ X as the image corresponding to the sampled image
z transformed by the group element g∆.
We can now define specific GI to be the subsets of G(I) such that with z = Φ−1(I), the set Gz = {Φ(I) : I ∈
GIz} corresponds to the support of the marginal distribution P on {Φ(I) : I ∈ G(Iz)}. We refer to Gz as
transformation sets. By definition of GI and bijectivity of Φ, there is an injective mapping from any z ∈ X
to the set of transformation sets G.
A.2 Proof of Theorem 1
Please refer to Section A.1 for the necessary notation for this section. Furthermore, define Lnat(f) :=
Lnat(f ; 0, 0).
We prove the first statement of the theorem by contradiction. Let f rob be the minimizer of Lrob(f) and let us
assume that f rob 6∈ V and in particular that it is constant on all transformation sets except Gz ∈ G and the
marginal distribution over G that can be defined as P ({GX = U}) = P ({X ∈ U}) for any U ∈ G, is discrete
(for simplicity of presentation) and Gz has non-zero probability.
Let’s assume that there is at least one transformation set Gz, on which f rob is not constant and collect all
different values in the set A = {f rob(x) : x ∈ Gz} (with cardinality strictly bigger than 1 since f not constant)
and denote the distribution over x ∈ Gz by Pz. Since there is a unique mapping Ψ that maps each x ∈ X to
a unique transformation (see Section A.1), we can lower bound of the robust loss as follows for any z ∈ X :
E X,Y sup
x′∈GX
`(f(x′), Y )
= E [ sup
x′∈GX
`(f(x′), Y )|X 6∈ Gz]P({X 6∈ Gz}) + E Y |z[ sup
x′∈Gz
`(f(x′), Y )|Gz]P({X ∈ Gz})
≥ E [ sup
x′∈GX
`(f(x′), Y )|X 6∈ Gz]P({X 6∈ Gz}) + sup
a∈A
∫
E Y |x`(a, Y )dPz(x) (5)
where the inequality follows from
E X|zE Y |x[sup
a∈A
`(a, Y )|X = x]|Gz =
∫
E Y |x sup
a∈A
`(a, Y )dPz(x) ≥ sup
a∈A
∫
E Y |x`(a, Y )dPz(x).
The right hand side is minimized with respect to the set A by choosing A = {a?} where a? is defined as
a? = arg mina
∫
E Y |x`(a, Y )dPz(x) because setting f?(x) = a? for all x ∈ Gz and f?(x) = f rob(x) else leads
to equality in equation (5) and f? ∈ F by assumption that V ⊆ F . Morever, since P({X ∈ Gz}) > 0 by
assumption, choosing f?(x) = a? for all x ∈ Gz implies Lrob(f?) < Lrob(f rob) which contradicts optimality
of f rob and thus proves the first statement of the theorem.
For the second statement let us rewrite
Lrob(f) = Lnat(f) + [Lrob(f)− Lnat(f)]
= E `(f(X,Y ) + E [max
∆′∈S
`(f(T (X,∆′)), Y )− `(f(X), Y )]︸ ︷︷ ︸
R˜(f)
By the first statement we know that the set of invariant functions that minimize the robust loss
F rob := {f ∈ V : Lrob(f) ≤ Lrob(f ′) ∀f ′ ∈ F}
is non-empty. For all f ∈ F rob, it holds by definition of V that R˜(f) = 0.
Since V(R) ⊆ V, the minimizers fmin of (O1) satisfy Lnat(fmin) ≤ Lnat(f) for all f ∈ V. But because fmin
in V we have Lrob(f) = Lnat(f) and it directly follows that fmin ∈ F rob. The same argument goes through
for (O2) since for all f ∈ V, we have Lrob(f) = Lnat(f). This concludes the proof of the theorem.
A.3 Proof of Theorem 2
On a high level, similar to the proof of Theorem 1, we can construct a minimizer of the natural loss f?V
given the assumption that Y ⊥⊥ X|Gz. Since on V both losses are equivalent, together with Theorem 1 this
shows that the robust minimizer also minimizes the unconstrained natural loss.
Assume fnat 6∈ V minimizes Lnat(f), and in particular, it is constant on all transformation sets except Gz for
some z ∈ X . Again by existence of a mapping Ψ and by assumption Y ⊥⊥ X|Gz we can write for any f
Lnat(f) = E X,Y `(f(X), Y ) (6)
= E [`(f(X), Y )|X 6∈ Gz]P({X 6∈ Gz}) + E [`(f(X), Y )|Gz]P({X ∈ Gz})
= E [`(f(X), Y )|X 6∈ Gz]P({X 6∈ Gz}) + E [E Y [`(f(X), Y )]|Gz]P({X ∈ Gz}).
We then obtain
E
[
E Y [`(f(X), Y )]|Gz
]
=
∫
E [`(f(x), Y )|x]dPz(x)
≥
∫
min
x′∈Gz
E [`(f(x′), Y )|x′]dPz(x) = E
[
E Y [`(f?(X), Y )]|Gz
]
(7)
when setting f?(x) = minx∈Gz E Y `(fnat(x), Y )|Gz for all x ∈ Gz and f?(x) = fnat(x) otherwise. Together
with equation (6), we thus have that Lnat(f?) = Lnat(fnat) ≤ Lnat(f) for all f ∈ F by definition of fnat.
If additionally the support of Pz is equal to Gz and ` is injective, the inequality (7) becomes a strict inequality
for fnat 6∈ F and hence we have Lnat(f?) < Lnat(fnat) which contradicts the definition of fnat being the
minimizer of the natural loss.
B Two-stage STN
Since STNs are known to be sensitive to hyperparameter settings and thus difficult to train end-to-end [41],
we apply the following two-stage procedure to simulate its functionality: (1) we first train a ResNet-32 as a
localization regression network (LocNet) to predict the attack perturbation separately by learning from a
training set, which contains perturbed images and uses the transformations as the prediction targets; (2)
at the same time we train a ResNet-32 classifier with data augmentation, namely random translations and
rotations; (3) during the test phase, the output of the LocNet is used by a spatial transformer module that
transforms the image before entering the pretrained classifier. We refer to this two-stage STN as STN+.
LocNet and Classifier For the classifiers, we take the two models trained on CIFAR-10 and SVHN using
standard data augmentation and random rotations from our previous experiments. Since we do not expect the
regressors (or LocNets) to be perfect in terms of prediction capability, there will still be some transformation
left after the regression stage. Thus, the classifiers should effectively see a smaller range of transformations
than without the inclusion of a LocNet and transformer module. The training procedure used to train the
classifiers is described in Section 3.4.
Effect of rendering edges on LocNet The LocNet is trained on zero padded – suffix (c) – as well as
reflect padded inputs – suffix (r) – for comparison. The former possibly yields an unfair advantage of this
approach compared to other methods as the neural network can exploit the edges (induced through zero
padding) to learn the transformation parameters. Therefore, we also consider reflection padding to assess
the effect of the different paddings on final performance. Nonetheless, zero padding is consistent with the
augmentation setting for the end-to-end trained networks and regularized methods and was also the choice
considered by [11]. For completeness we also show results when using reflection padding for training LocNet
although it lacks comparability with the other methods since attacks should be reflection-padded as well.
Minimizing loss of information in the prediction transformation process In the spatial transformer
module we compare two variants of handling the labels predicted by the LocNet. We can either back-transform
the transformed image with the negative predicted labels, which will, under the assumption that the regressor
successfully learnt object orientations, turn back the image but potentially result in extra padding space
before we feed the images into the classifier. Alternatively, we can subtract the predicted transformation
from the attack transformation, then use the remaining transformation as the new “attack transformation”.
The latter will result in much smaller padding areas, if the LocNet is performing well. From the experimental
results we do see a big drop if we naively transform images twice. We denote the former method as “naive”
and latter as “trick”.
Observed results For CIFAR-10, this two-stage classifier achieved relatively high grid accuracies. However,
the obtained accuracies are still lower than expected, given that the LocNet is allowed to learn rotations with
a separately trained regressor on the transformed training set. For SVHN we also see a gain compared to
adversarial training without regularizer. However, the performance still lags behind the accuracies obtained
by the regularizers. The results are summarized in Table 3.
Table 3: Accuracies of two-stage STN (STN+) under different settings. Details are provided in Section B.
Dataset STN+(c) trick STN+(r) trick STN+(c) naive STN+(r) naive
SVHN (nat) 94.92 95.51 94.92 95.51
(rob) 90.95 90.28 64.91 59.68
CIFAR10 (nat) 91.29 90.99 91.29 90.99
(rob) 83.05 84.31 44.88 42.84
C More experimental results
In this section we discuss additional experimental results that we collected and and analyzed.
C.1 Stability to selection of regularization parameter λ
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Figure 4: Test grid accuracy (first row) and test natural accuracy (second row) as a function of the
regularization parameter λ for the SVHN (first column) and CIFAR-10 (second column) datasets and data
augmentation (“rnd”). The test grid accuracy is relatively robust in a large range of λ values while natural
test accuracy decreases with larger values of λ.
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Figure 5: Test grid accuracy (first row) and test natural accuracy (second row) as a function of the
regularization parameter λ for the SVHN (first column) and CIFAR-10 (second column) datasets and Wo-k
defenses. The test grid accuracy is relatively robust in a large range of λ values while natural test accuracy
decreases with larger values of λ.
Figures 4 and 5 show the test grid and test natural accuracy as a function of the regularization parameter λ.
We observe that the regularization methods outperform unregularized methods in terms of grid accuracy in a
large range of λ values.
C.2 Additional experimental results
Table 4: Mean accuracies of models trained without regularized adversarial training. Standard errors are
shown in parentheses.
std std* AT(rob, Wo-10) AT(mix, Wo-10)
SVHN (nat) 95.48 (0.15) 93.97 (0.09) 96.03 (0.03) 96.56 (0.07)
(rob) 18.85 (1.27) 82.60 (0.23) 90.35 (0.27) 88.83 (0.10)
CIFAR-10 (nat) 92.11 (0.18) 89.93 (0.18) 91.76 (0.23) 93.44 (0.19)
(rob) 9.52 (0.66) 58.29 (0.60) 71.17 (0.26) 68.14 (0.48)
CIFAR-100 (nat) 70.23 (0.18) 66.62 (0.37) 68.79 (0.34) 73.03 (0.13)
(rob) 5.09 (0.25) 28.53 (0.25) 38.21 (0.10) 35.93 (0.24)
Mixed batch experiments In addition to the results reported in the main text, in this section we also
report results on more experiments that use the “mixed batch” setting, meaning that the gradient of the
loss is taken with respect to both the adversarial and natural examples. This is common practice in the `p
adversarial example literature [21] and we denote this approach by “mix”. As can be seen in Table 4, for
adversarial training a mixed batch improves natural accuracy at the expense of test grid performance. For
the regularization methods, we observe a much small, and not consistent, effect of the batch type as can be
seen in Table 6. For example, comparing ALP(rob, ·) vs. ALP(mix, ·) shows that the performance differences
are mostly not significant.
Table 5: Mean accuracies of models trained with various forms of regularized adversarial training, using the
KL regularization function. Standard errors are shown in parentheses.
KL(nat,
rnd)
KL(nat,
Wo-10)
KL(rob,
Wo-10)
KL-C(mix,
S-PGD)
KL(nat,
S-PGD)
SVHN (nat) 96.16 (0.10) 96.00 (0.02) 96.13 (0.07) 96.14 (0.04) 96.54 (0.01)
(rob) 90.69 (0.05) 92.27 (0.09) 92.71 (0.09) 92.42 (0.03) 92.62 (0.03)
CIFAR-10 (nat) 89.33 (0.16) 90.83 (0.18) 90.41 (0.05) 89.98 (0.21) 89.82 (0.13)
(rob) 73.50 (0.19) 77.34 (0.19) 77.47 (0.28) 78.93 (0.23) 78.89 (0.07)
Table 6: Mean accuracies of models trained with various forms of regularized adversarial training, using the
`2 and ALP regularization functions. Standard errors are shown in parentheses.
`2(nat,
Wo-10)
`2(rob,
Wo-10)
ALP(mix,
Wo-10)
ALP(rob,
Wo-10)
ALP(mix,
Wo-20)
ALP(rob,
S-PGD)
ALP(mix,
S-PGD)
SVHN (nat) 96.05 (0.04) 96.53 (0.03) 96.41 (0.07) 96.3 (0.09) 96.39 (0.04) 96.11 (0.08) 96.30 (0.09)
(rob) 92.16 (0.05) 92.55 (0.08) 92.17 (0.11) 92.04 (0.19) 92.48 (0.05) 92.32 (0.17) 92.42 (0.20)
CIFAR-10 (nat) 88.32 (0.13) 90.53 (0.16) 91.13 (0.13) 90.11 (0.25) 90.67 (0.12) 89.85 (0.27) 89.70 (0.10)
(rob) 75.46 (0.25) 77.06 (0.16) 75.89 (0.23) 75.90 (0.31) 76.72 (0.21) 77.80 (0.17) 77.72 (0.35)
CIFAR-100 (nat) - - 68.54 (0.27) - 68.04 (0.27) 89.82 (0.13) 68.44 (0.39)
(rob) - - 49.30 (0.33) - 49.98 (0.31) 78.89 (0.07) 52.58 (0.20)
Table 7: Mean standard and grid (rob) accuracies of models trained with various forms of regularized
adversarial training, using the rnd (equivalent to Wo-1), Wo-10 and Wo-20 defense mechanisms for KL (left)
and ALP (right). Standard errors are shown in parentheses.
KL(nat,
Wo-1)
KL(nat,
Wo-10)
KL(nat,
Wo-20)
ALP(rob,
Wo-1)
ALP(rob,
Wo-10)
ALP(rob,
Wo-20)
CIFAR-10 (nat) 89.34 (0.16) 90.83 (0.18) 89.33 (0.22) 89.47 (0.04) 90.11 (0.25) 90.62 (0.07)
(rob) 73.40 (0.19) 77.34 (0.19) 77.52 (0.16) 73.22 (0.14) 75.90 (0.31) 76.78 (0.15)
Table 8: Mean accuracies of models trained with various forms of augmented training, i.e. unregularized and
regularized data augmentation. Standard errors are shown in parentheses.
std* `2(nat, rnd) KL(nat, rnd) ALP(rob, rnd) KL(rob, rnd) ALP(mix, rnd)
SVHN (nat) 93.97 (0.09) 96.34 (0.08) 96.16 (0.10) 96.09 (0.06) 96.23 (0.08) 96.19 (0.07)
(rob) 82.60 (0.23) 90.51 (0.15) 90.69 (0.05) 90.48 (0.16) 90.92 (0.17) 90.48 (0.15)
CIFAR-10 (nat) 89.93 (0.18) 87.80 (0.11) 89.34 (0.16) 88.75 (0.18) 89.47 (0.04) 89.43 (0.28)
(rob) 58.29 (0.60) 71.60 (0.27) 73.50 (0.19) 71.49 (0.30) 73.22 (0.14) 71.97 (0.11)
Table 9: Mean accuracies of models trained with various forms of regularized adversarial training. Standard
errors are shown in parentheses.
ALP(nat, Wo-10) `2(nat, Wo-10) KL-C(nat, Wo-10) KL(nat, Wo-10)
SVHN (nat) 96.39 (0.03) 96.05 (0.04) 96.18 (0.06) 96.00 (0.02)
(rob) 91.98 (0.13) 92.16 (0.05) 91.99 (0.12) 92.27 (0.09)
CIFAR10 (nat) 88.78 (0.11) 88.32 (0.13) 89.61 (0.09) 90.83 (0.18)
(rob) 75.43 (0.13) 75.46 (0.25) 76.15 (0.23) 77.34 (0.19)
Weakness of first order attack. Table 10 shows the accuracies of various models trained with S-PGD
defenses and evaluated against the S-PGD and the grid search attack on all datasets. We observe that
the S-PGD attack constitutes are very weak attack since the associated accuracies are much larger than
for the grid search attack. In other words, the S-PGD attack only yields a very loose upper bound on the
adversarial accuracy. This stands in stark contrast to `∞ attacks and has first been noted and discussed in
[11]. Interestingly, using the first order method as a defense mechanism proves to be very effective in terms of
grid accuracy. When used in combination with a regularizer this defense yields the largest overall accuracies
as shown and discussed in Section 4. Recall that due to computational reasons grid search cannot be used
as a defense mechanism. Therefore, the strongest computationally feasible defense does not use the same
mechanism as the strongest attack in our setting.
AT(mix, S-PGD) AT(rob,S-PGD) ALP(mix, S-PGD)
SVHN (nat) 96.27 (0.00) 96.06 (0.10) 96.30 (0.09)
(grid) 84.81 (0.01) 87.29 (0.09) 92.42 (0.20)
(S-PGD) 95.26 (0.04) 95.46 (0.10) 95.92 (0.13)
CIFAR-10 (nat) 92.19 (0.23) 91.83 (0.19) 89.70 (0.10)
(grid) 64.26 (0.25) 69.74 (0.27) 77.72 (0.35)
(S-PGD) 88.84 (0.27) 89.87 (0.10) 88.15 (0.21)
CIFAR-100 (nat) 71.11 (0.37) 68.87 (0.19) 68.44 (0.39)
(grid) 33.40 (0.21) 37.87 (0.12) 52.58 (0.20)
(S-PGD) 65.01 (0.32) 65.56 (0.12) 66.04 (0.40)
Table 10: Mean accuracies of different models trained with S-PGD defenses and evaluated on the natural test
set, against the S-PGD attack and against the grid search attack on the SVHN, CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100
datasets. While the test accuracy for the S-PGD attack is only slightly lower than the natural accuracy in
most cases, the grid accuracy is significantly smaller.
Stronger grid search attack To evaluate how much grid accuracy changes with a finer discretization of
the perturbation set S, we compare the default grid to a finer one for a subset of experiments, summarized in
Table 11. Specifically, “(grid-775)" shows the test grid accuracy using the default grid containing 5 values
per translation direction and 31 values for rotation, yielding a total of 775 transformed examples that are
evaluated for each Xi. “(grid-7500)” shows the test grid accuracy on a much finer grid with 10 values per
translation direction and 75 values for rotation, resulting 7500 transformed examples. We observe that the
test grid accuracy only decreases slightly for the finer grid and the reduction in accuracy is smaller for ALP
than for AT. Due to computational reasons we use the grid containing 775 values for all other experiments.
AT(mix,Wo-10) AT(rob,Wo-10) ALP(mix,Wo-10)
SVHN (grid-775) 88.83 (0.10) 89.75 (0.17) 92.17 (0.11)
(grid-7500) 88.02 (0.12) 89.29 (0.15) 91.79 (0.12)
CIFAR-10 (grid-775) 68.14 (0.48) 70.35 (0.16) 75.89 (0.23)
(grid-7500) 65.69 (0.28) 68.28 (0.16) 74.58 (0.16)
CIFAR-100 (grid-775) 35.93 (0.24) 38.21 (0.10) 49.30 (0.33)
(grid-7500) 33.62 (0.23) 36.04 (0.21) 47.95 (0.23)
Table 11: Mean accuracies for different models evaluated against two different grid search attacks. grid-775
represents test grid accuracy using the default grid with 775 transformed examples, grid-7500 shows test grid
accuracy on a much finer grid with 7500 transformed examples. Test grid accuracy only decreases slightly for
the finer grid and the reduction in accuracy is smaller for ALP than for AT.
C.3 Regularization effect on range of incorrect angles
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Figure 6: For 100 randomly chosen examples from the CIFAR-10 dataset, we show which rotations lead to a
misclassification by various models. Each row corresponds to one example and each column to one angle
in the interval [−30◦, 30◦]. A dark red square indicates that the corresponding example was misclassified
after being rotated by the corresponding angle. The visualization for AT(mix, rnd) is more fragmented than
for AT(rob, rnd) and ALP(mix, rnd) and the visualization for AT(mix,Wo-10) is more fragmented than for
AT(rob,Wo-10) and ALP(mix,Wo-10).
